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This paper proposes to tackle the problem of digital inequality by introducing digital technologies of 
knowledge generation and decision-making to a feminist critique of rationality that is informed by 
discourse theory and intersectional perspectives on gender and gendered relations of inequality. 
Therefore, it takes a closer look at the epistemological foundations of Big Data as one prominent 
representation of digital technologies. While Big Data and Big Data-based results and decisions are 
generally believed to be objective and neutral, numeral cases of algorithmic discrimination have lately 
begged to differ. This paper argues that algorithmic discrimination is neither random nor accidental; 
on the contrary, it is – amongst others – the result of the epistemological foundation of Big Data – 
namely: data fundamentalism, post-explanatory anticipatory pragmatics, and anti-political solution-
ism. As a consequence, a critical engagement with the concepts and premises that become material-
ized in the design of digital technologies is needed, if they are not to silently (re)produce social ine-
qualities. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The algorithmically processed and (partially) 
autonomous generation and analysis of mostly 
heterogeneous and unstructured large-scale data 
sets, so-called Big Data, for the production of 
knowledge is a prominent and much debated ex-
ample of current developments in digital tech-
nology.1 Advocates of Big Data promise the pro-
duction of more, better, and most importantly 
predictive knowledge that is said to improve the 
lives of all human beings and solve the great 
problems of mankind (Anderson 2008; Mayer-
Schönberger and Cukier 2013; Geiselberger and 
Moorstedt 2013). Critics, contrariwise, warn 
against potential privacy breaches and surveil-
lance risks should Big Data turn into Big Brother 
(van Dijk 2014; Zuboff 2015). Lately, a growing 
number of research, mostly informed by science 
and technology studies (STS), refuses to take a 
deterministic or essentialist stance and calls for 
differentiated analyses of the historical, socio-
cultural, political, and economic preconditions 
and effects of Big Data (early: boyd and Craw-
ford 2012; Gitelman 2013).2 The latter strand of 
research tends to be skeptical of the promises 
made in the name of Big Data, and emphasizes 
the disparities between the programmatic dis-
courses surrounding Big Data and the material 
phenomenon called Big Data.3 All parties alike, 
however, seem to agree that Big Data constitutes 
a “computational turn in thought and research” 
(boyd and Crawford 2012: 665; also Kitchin 
2014), whereas Big Data can be understood as 
an “emerging Weltanschauung grounded across 
multiple domains in the public and private sec-
1 Within Big Data two theoretically and technically 
dis-tinct phenomena – algorithmic processing and 
data – come together, whose distinction and relation 
demand a thorough examination that cannot be 
accomplished here. 2 Research concerned with these 
kind of questions is pre-dominantly conducted under 
the labels Critical Data Studies, Critical Algorithm 
Studies, or Critical Code Stud-ies displaying the yet to 
be closed terminological discus-sions. In the German-
speaking context the discussion is 
tors, one that is need of [sic] deeper critical en-
gagement.” (Crawford et al. 2014: 1664; origi-
nal emphasis) 
Big Data and Big Data-based results and deci-
sions are generally believed to be objective and 
neutral; however, numeral cases of algorithmic 
discrimination have lately begged to differ 
(O’Neil 2018 [2016]; Eubanks 2018). Google’s 
ad posting algorithm has, for example, been 
demonstrated to display advertisements for jobs 
in management positions as well as for execu-
tive training programs significantly more often 
to persons whose browser profile identifies them 
as male, than to those whose profile identifies 
them as female (Datta et al. 2015). Data-based 
risk assessment tools, which are widely em-
ployed in the US criminal justice system, to 
name a second example, have been shown to 
systematically attest African Americans a higher 
risk of committing a future crime than so-called 
white Americans (Angwin et al. 2016). When 
these and similar cases of algorithmic discrimi-
nation gain the attention of the wider public, the 
resounding outcry testifies to the broken prom-
ises of objective knowledge production and neu-
tral decision-making. The vocabulary used to 
understand what is going on, when algorithms 
are sexist or racist, often refers to terms such as 
bias, error or distortion, suggesting that objec-
tive results are possible once all errors are elim-
inated (Zweig 2018) and, thereby, maintaining 
the modern ideal of “mechanical objectivity” 
(Daston and Gallison 1992). 
This paper, by contrast, draws on the insights of 
STS in assuming that processes and practices of 
knowledge production as well as the technical 
artifacts employed within these processes are 
only just beginning, with pioneering publications such as 
Mämecke et al. 2018, and Houben and Prietl 2018. 
3 Discursively powerful buzzwords such as ‘digital trans-
formation’ and ‘data revolution’ suggest that Big Data has 
no history, whereas the material phenomenon of Big Data 
is far older than its discursive popularity (Barnes 2013; 
Barnes and Wilson 2014: 1-2). At the same time, current 
manifestations of Big Data fall far behind the promises 
made its name (Beer 2016: 2). 
neither neutral, nor objective, but highly politi-
cal (Winner 1980). From this perspective it is of 
paramount importance to critically analyze the 
epistemological foundations and premises of 
digital technologies such as Big Data. This paper 
contributes to this endeavor by introducing Big 
Data to a feminist critique of rationality that is 
informed by discourse theoretical perspectives 
on the relation of knowledge and power and in-
tersectional perspectives on gender and gen-
dered relations of inequality (see section 2). It, 
therefore, focusses on the epistemological foun-
dation and premises of Big Data-based 
knowledge production and decision-making as 
they are articulated within the discourses sur-
rounding Big Data. Following David Beer 
(2016: 5), it is vital to better understand the dis-
courses produced in the name of Big Data as “it 
is also the very concept of Big Data itself that 
shapes decisions, judgments and notions of 
value – as it brings with it a vision for particular 
types of calculative or numerical knowing about 
individuals, groups and the social world”.4 Syn-
thesizing the promises made in the name of Big 
Data as well as the critique brought against Big 
Data, three epistemological premises are por-
trayed as central to Big Data-based knowledge 
production and decision making – namely: data 
fundamentalism, post-explanatory anticipatory 
pragmatics, and anti-political solutionism. In 
order to introduce this epistemological triad of 
Big Data to a feminist critique of rationality, it 
is asked how these assumptions underlying Big 
Data are related to gender and gendered rela-
tions of power and inequality.5 Put differently, 
this paper is concerned with how Big Data is 
gendered on the level of its epistemological 
foundation (see section 3). Finally, the results of 
this analysis are summarized and discussed (see 
section 4). 
4 As discursive phenomenon the discourses 
surrounding Big Data are neither congruent with the 
socio-material phenomenon called Big Data, nor can the 
one be directly deduced from or reduced to the other. 
5 Thus, the focus of this paper is neither on the 
gendered inequalities of data-based resource allocation 
(Fourcade 
2 THEORETICAL APPROACH 
This paper is situated in the tradition of critical 
engagements with (Western, masculine) ration-
ality and modern objectivity within STS, but 
also more generally within the social sciences 
and humanities.6 It, thus, assumes that (scien-
tific) knowledge production is a social endeavor 
of utmost political significance, whereat tech-
nical artifacts play a crucial role and do them-
selves have politics (for an overview from a 
feminist perspective see Singer 2005). This pa-
per’s feminist critique of rationality is especially 
inspired by Donna Haraway’s work that is 
known for its early posthumanist and neomateri-
alist perspectives on the power dynamics em-
bedded in information and communication tech-
nologies (ICTs). The analysis proposed further 
draws on Foucault’ian discourse theoretical per-
spectives on knowledge production and truth 
claims as well as on intersectional approaches to 
gender, according to which gender is always in-
tersecting with other categories of social differ-
entiation and inequality. 
Haraway describes ICTs as essential for the de-
velopment of hybrid assemblages called “tech-
nosciences” within which the boundaries be-
tween technical and natural sciences, applied 
and basic research, science, economy, and poli-
tics become blurred (Singer 2005: 21). Techno-
sciences establish a new mode of reasoning that 
is no longer based on the Newtonian logics of 
deduction and induction, but promotes a reflex-
ive trial-and-error approach. Instead of search-
ing for the universal laws of nature, research and 
knowledge production shift to finding (tech-
nical) solutions and real-world applications of 
knowledge (Weber 2017: 350-353). Following 
Haraway, technosciences such as Big Data are 
to be understood as concrete representations of 
and Healy 2013), nor on the gender aspects of the so-
called “digital divide” or “digital inequality” (DiMaggio 
et al. 2004). 
6 Important contributions to this discussion stem also from 
the eponym of this conference, Joseph Weizenbaum (e.g. 
1990 [1976]). 
globally dominant technologies, but also as a 
specific approach to the world that transports 
certain possibilities of generating knowledge 
and of political engagement. 
Haraway further offers a feminist and anti-racist 
perspective on technosciences that sensitizes to 
structures and processes of patriarchal, colonial, 
and capitalist power embedded within scientific 
practices and technical artifacts, without demon-
izing technology in general or claiming inno-
cence for feminist approaches.7 Emphasizing 
that every knowledge or truth claim is “situ-
ated”, Haraway calls for taking responsibility 
for one’s truth claims and making one’s stand-
point visible (2017 [1995]). This includes tech-
nical artifacts such as technologies of measure-
ment or visualization that Haraway understands 
as agents in the discursive-material processes of 
knowledge production. According to Haraway, 
the technical reconfiguration of the world cannot 
be understood as a neutral project, but as a 
highly contested political endeavor. Therefore, 
it is important for a feminist critique of rational-
ity as well as for an engaged intervention in the 
technological development to scrutinize the 
mode of reasoning, the rationalities, and the 
powerful norms of producing knowledge and 
making decisions promoted by the concept of 
Big Data. 
Drawing on the discourse theoretical work of 
Michel Foucault (2012 [1976]) the interdepend-
encies between knowledge and power can be 
conceptualized in some more detail. According 
to Foucault, there is no such thing as objective 
truth, but only knowledge claims that are 
acknowledged to be true. Thereby, power un-
folds by means of knowledge, by “developing, 
organizing, and circulating a certain knowledge 
or rather knowledge apparatuses” (1978: 87). 
These knowledge apparatuses work as histori-
cally contingent “regimes of truth” that 
(pre)structure the acknowledged modes of rea-
soning as well as the norms according to which 
7 In her famous Cyborg Manifesto she highlights the pos-
sibilities of overcoming the modern hierarchies 
between male and female or culture and nature by 
technical means (Haraway 2004 [1985]). 
someone can come to know something at all. As 
indicated by Beer (2016), Big Data can be un-
derstood as such a regime of truth and, thus, 
needs to be confronted with the question of who 
can become a producer of true knowledge within 
the concept of Big Data, how can truth claims be 
made, and what can consequently be known and 
what not. 
Last but not least, this paper takes an intersec-
tional perspective on gender and gendered rela-
tions of power and inequality. According to the 
concept of intersectionality gender is always in-
tersecting with other categories of social differ-
entiation such as class, age, sexuality or 
race/ethnicity. Instead of taking one form of 
domination/marginalization as prior to others, it 
is an empirical question, how different modes of 
domination/subordination intersect, reinforcing 
each other or suspending one another (for an 
overview see Davis 2008; Bührmann 2009). Ac-
cordingly, this analysis is not limited to binary 
forms of gendered power relations or relations 
of inequality, such as men vs. women or mascu-
line vs. feminine, but takes into account more 
complex forms of intersecting axes of power and 
inequality. 
3 THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL 
TRIAD OF BIG DATA 
Data Fundamentalism 
“Before big data, our analysis was usually lim-
ited to testing a small number of hypotheses that 
we defined well before we even collected the 
data. When we let the data speak, we can make 
connections that we had never thought existed.” 
(Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013) 
The concept of Big data promotes the idea of a 
“data-driven rather than knowledge-driven sci-
ence” (Kitchin 2014: 1). The key to this suppos-
edly strictly inductive mode of reasoning is the 
idea that (self-learning) algorithms search 
‘freely’ – that is without recourse to theoretical 
models or hypotheses – for patterns in large data 
sets, uncovering connections between different 
variables that would not have been foreseeable, 
thus producing new knowledge in its purest 
form. Instead of testing theoretical models and 
hypotheses, and thereby proceeding deduc-
tively, the concept of Big Data idealizes “the pri-
macy of inductive reasoning in the form of a 
technology-based empiricism” (Mazzocchi 
2014: 1250). 
Big Data’s “data fundamentalism” (Crawford 
2013) apparently resides on two equally contro-
versial epistemological premises: first “the be-
lief that life can be captured and modeled by data 
or even fully transformed into it” (Thatcher 
2014: 1768), and second the assumption that ob-
jectivity is the result of subject-free and there-
fore neutral production of knowledge. Both 
ideas have been heavily criticized within STS 
and shown to form specifically modern ideals of 
science. 
Historians of science have described how the 
idea that ‘nature should speak for itself’ became 
dominant throughout the 19th century in modern 
Western societies. Whereas personal judgment 
was considered an important prerequisite for any 
scientist in the 18th century, the new notion of 
“mechanical” or “non-interventionist” objectiv-
ity (Daston and Galison 1992) disavowed the 
scientist as the subject of knowledge production. 
In contrast to the then spreading machines and 
technical apparatuses of observation and meas-
urement the scientist was portrayed as a source 
of prejudice and misinterpretation and, thus, as 
a threat to the supposedly pure image of nature. 
With the replacement of the human body with 
technical artifacts, numerical data became in-
creasingly important for the production and 
communication of scientific knowledge. Since 
numbers can be communicated independently, 
or so it seems, from the persons, places, times, 
and contexts of their production, they became 
swiftly regarded as the ideal manifestation of 
neutral objectivity (also Heintz 2007; Singer 
2005: 62-67). 
Numerous contributions within STS have 
pointed out that there is no such thing as a sub-
ject-free, neutral discovery of the laws of nature. 
Neither can reality be simply depicted by or 
transferred into data. Recently, Critical Data 
Studies have pointed out with regards to Big 
Data that the notion of “raw data is an oxymo-
ron” (Gitelman 2013), as data are always already 
‘cooked’. Consequently, also Big Data have to 
be understood as the product of numerous prac-
tices of categorization and classification, of the 
production of comparability, and of the demar-
cation between what gets included and what is 
not, between what is considered as relevant and 
what is not (see also Heintz 2010; Mau 2017: 30; 
Busch 2017). 
Feminist work in STS has further demonstrated 
that the modern Western ideal of science resides 
on the notion of a rational, non-situated, and 
bodyless subject of knowledge that has been 
constituted in contrast to the notion of the emo-
tionally bound and physically situated ‘others’, 
namely: women and people of color (Singer 
2005: 83). Thus, the notion of objectivity as a 
‘view from nowhere’ has to be considered to be 
androcentric as well as Eurocentric. It has long 
served to legitimize the exclusion of women and 
people of color from academia, and continues to 
marginalize forms of knowledge and modes of 
reasoning that are based on lived bodily experi-
ence or oral traditions (Haraway 2017 [1995]; 
also Bath 2009). 
In the context of Big Data a revival of this mod-
ern ideal of western, masculine rationality and 
subject-free objectivity can be witnessed that 
potentially reopens the doors for diverse gen-
dered inequalities. Renyi Hong (2016), for ex-
ample, observes a double marginalization of 
women in the course of profiling Big Data-
methods within human resources (HR): First the 
association of computing, programming, and an-
alytical skills with masculinity paths the way for 
discriminating against women professionals in 
HR. Second, the demand for ‘hard numbers’ in 
HR tends to neglect emotional work and other 
work mostly done by women that is difficult to 
quantify and model by data. Others draw com-
parable lessons from historic experiences of 
quantification efforts in human geography or so-
cial physics: The call for numerical representa-
tion is considered to favor mechanistic concep-
tions of the world that tend to be unsuitable to 
grasp power relations, inequalities, and cultural 
or symbolic phenomena (Barnes and Wilson 
2014: 10; Kitchin 2014: 8; Mazzocchi 2014). 
Post-Explanatory Anticipatory Pragmatics 
“Who knows why people do what they do? The 
point is they do it, and we can track and measure 
it with unprecedented fidelity.” (Anderson 
2008) 
The concept of Big Data shifts the prime object 
of knowledge production from understanding or 
explaining a phenomenon – that is asking the 
why- or how-questions – to generating probabil-
istic predictions about a phenomenon that allow 
for describing or predicting its future appear-
ance. Reasoning then moves increasingly from 
“data gathered about the past to simulations or 
probabilistic anticipations of the future that in 
turn demand action in the present” (Adams et al. 
2009: 255), as can currently be observed in 
fields as diverse as the criminal justice system or 
credit scoring, where “post-explanatory prag-
matics” (Andrejevic 2014: 1675) meet with a 
“regime of anticipation” (Adams et al. 2009). 
The method of choice to implement this new 
purpose of knowledge production is processing 
large amounts of data with the help of regression 
analysis (boyd and Crawford 2012). Regression 
analysis searches for patterns in the relationship 
between different variables by calculating how 
they correlate in a given data sample; proposing 
a model of this relationship, it then allows for 
predicting how these variables co-develop in the 
8 Furthermore, it is difficult to contradict the results of 
Big Data analyses for at least three reasons: First, 
equipped with the symbolic authority of data, a 
successful objection requires either alternative data or a 
well-founded critique of the available data (see for a 
similar argument Heintz 2010: 172). Whereas the latter 
requires insight into how the Big Data-analysis at 
hand operates, the former re-quires considerable 
resources to come up with data on 
future. Put differently, big data analysis operates 
on the assumption that patterns found in data of 
the past allow for approximating the future. 
Geoffrey Bowker (2014) argues that Big Data, 
by virtue of this methodological approach, of-
fers a possibility of finding patterns for instance 
in human behavior that do not originate in stere-
otypical classifications such as women being 
more social. The tendency, however, to refrain 
from understanding the correlations identified, 
quickly turns this advantage into a disadvantage, 
as can be exemplified through Google’s sexist 
ad posting algorithm: When the fact that women 
are underrepresented in leading positions is dis-
covered as a pattern in data analysis – which is 
highly likely due to the gendered segregation of 
the labor market – and this pattern then forms 
the basis for choices in ad posting – what can 
only be assumed due to the lack of transparency 
of Google’s algorithms –, women will by the 
very means of this data-based technology be less 
encouraged to make a career, eventually con-
firming the initially found pattern – or sociolog-
ically speaking, reproducing the existing social 
inequalities. In other words, not asking why 
there are few women in leadership positions, 
easily leads to misjudging the patterns discov-
ered by data analysis as positivistic expression 
of the truth, and consequently confirming the 
gendered structures of social inequality.  
The motto “correlation trumps causation” 
(Bowker 2014) within the concept of Big Data, 
therefore, rapidly unfolds a conservative ten-
dency, with social inequalities being reproduced 
by the very means of the epistemological and 
methodological design of Big Data-technolo-
gies.8 Whereas this may seem harmless when it 
comes to ad postings, the same logic applies in 
one’s own. Second, decisions based on Big Data analyses 
are difficult to criticize, because no reason or explanation 
is given that qualifies for a certain decision (Andrejevic 
2014: 1679; O'Neil 2018 [2016]). Ultimately, Lessing’s 
(1999) dictum "code is law" also applies to Big Data. 
Where there is no human, but a machine behind a deci-
sion, there is also no one to direct criticism or objection 
to. 
more serious cases such as racist risk assess-
ment. 
Anti-Political Solutionism 
“[T]he most important thing we at Facebook can 
do is develop the social infrastructure to give 
people the power to build a global community 
that works for all of us […] – for supporting us, 
for keeping us safe, for informing us, for civic 
engagement, and for inclusion of all.” (Zucker-
berg 2017) 
Research concerned with the digital avant-garde 
of Silicon Valley as one important birthplace of 
big data describes a “solutionist ethos” as prev-
alent amongst Big Data evangelists (Morozov 
2014; Nachtwey and Seidl 2017). The utopias, 
being portrayed around digital technologies, de-
pict the world as being full of ‘bugs’ that need 
to be ‘fixed’. The preferred means to do so, are 
technological ones, especially ICTs, digital 
technologies, and last but not least Big Data. The 
core idea of the promoted anti-political solution-
ism is that every problem, including social prob-
lems, can ultimately be reduced to a series of 
small and, therefore, manageable problems, for 
which technological solutions are then to be 
found. The optimistic belief in technological 
progress in combination with libertarian ideals 
and a deep distrust in established politics draws 
on the so-called “Californian ideology” that has 
become prominent throughout the second half of 
the 20th century.9 Instead of political debate and 
public opinion formation, ICTs are supposed to 
create a virtual agora, a public space of discus-
sion, where everyone can speak freely and 
equally, thereby, pathing the way for democrati-
zation, decentralization, and emancipation 
(Dickel and Schrape 2015). 
9 Barbook and Cameron (1996) describe the 
“Californian ideology”, prevalent in Silicon Valley and 
related high-tech institutions of the US-westcoast, as a 
bizarre amal-gamation of “cultural bohemianism“, 
„hippie anarchism“ (56), and „anti-corporatism“ (52) 
at the one hand and „economic liberalism“ (56), 
„entrepreneurial zeal of the 
To make this vision come true, two things are 
needed according to high-tech solutionist: Hu-
mans need to live up to their full potential, which 
is supposed to be enabled by networking, the 
distribution and sharing of information, and, 
therefore, equal access to knowledge and tech-
nology. Additionally, all institutions that hinder 
or restrict the free unfolding of human potential, 
such as bureaucracy, are to be removed and a 
strict meritocracy is to be established (Barbook 
und Cameron 1996; Dickel and Schrape 2015; 
Nachtwey and Seidl 2017).  
At the same time, the protagonists of a Big Data-
based solutionism seem to fail to recognize not 
only the existing inequalities in access to digital 
technologies, but also the reproduction of power 
asymmetries and social inequalities within the 
virtual space (e.g. Zilien and Hargittai 2009). 
Likewise, the well documented effect that the 
meritocratic ideal stabilizes existing social ine-
qualities due to its disregard of the deeply em-
bedded structural inequalities in society (Becker 
and Hadjar 2017) is not problematized any fur-
ther. As Barbook and Cameron (1996: 49-50) ar-
gue, this may be due to the fact that the protag-
onists of the New Economy form themselves a 
well-educated, socio-economically privileged, 
mostly ‘white’ “virtual class” that is hardly ever 
affected by racism, social inequality or poverty. 
From a gender perspective it is to be added that 
with the rise of Big Data, activities and profes-
sions, such as computing, statistics or program-
ming, gain importance that are structurally dom-
inated by men and symbolically associated with 
masculinity.10 
With its anti-political solutionism the concept of 
Big Data privileges a focus on allegedly anti-po-
litical, purely factual aspects of reality and social 
yuppies“ (45), and „laissez faire ideology“ (52) at the 
other. 
10 The recently published anti-feminist manifesto by a 
Google employee and the following global echo on social 
media (Bovensiepen 2017) suggest further that sexist 
work cultures are still prevailing within the work spheres 
surrounding and implementing Big Data. 
life, thus ignoring its highly political and, there-
fore, inequality-relevant notions. Combined 
with the insensibility towards power asymme-
tries and social inequalities, Big Data further 
runs the risk of misjudging the perspective of a 
privileged view as universal perspective, render-
ing those in marginalized positions (again) in-
visible. 
4 DISCUSSION 
The discourses surrounding Big Data claim for 
it to establish a new regime of truth (and govern-
ance). The aim of this paper was to introduce the 
epistemological foundations of Big Data as they 
are articulated within these discourses to a fem-
inist critique of rationality. Systematically sort-
ing the promises made in the name of Big Data 
and the critique brought against them, three epis-
temological premises were discussed as central 
to understanding Big Data – namely: data fun-
damentalism, post-explanative anticipatory 
pragmatism, and anti-political solutionism. This 
epistemological triad has proven to be anything 
but (gender) neutral: The revival of the modern 
ideal of rationality and objectivity within the 
concept of Big Data links the subject of 
knowledge production once more to Western 
masculinity and threatens to marginalize modes 
of reasoning and aspects of reality beyond the 
androcentric and Eurocentric norm. The pri-
macy of correlation over causation facilitates the 
misjudgment of social inequalities as expres-
sions of positivistic truth. These tendencies are 
reinforced by an anti-political solutionist ethos 
embedded within the concept of Big Data that 
renders the privileged virtual class of Big Data 
protagonists insensitive towards gendered rela-
tions of power and inequality. In the light of 
these findings, the alleged biases of Big Data-
based analyses prove to be less the result of ran-
dom distortions or errors than the systematic 
consequence of the epistemological foundations 
of Big Data. 
Consequently, this paper argues that Big Data 
constitutes a specific approach to the world that 
transports certain possibilities of knowing, and 
is itself not neutral, but favors the reproduction 
of existing social inequalities. It does so by (1) 
privileging phenomena that are easily trans-
formed into (numerical) data and (distinct) cate-
gories and that are, therefore, more readily algo-
rithmically processable; by (2) promoting the 
generation of (probabilistic) knowledge about 
what there is (or will be), instead of the critical 
engagement with questions of why specific phe-
nomena have (not) come about; and by (3) fa-
voring the presumably non-political analyses of 
facts over normative discussions. Future empir-
ical research will have to examine whether this 
analytical argument holds true across diverse ar-
eas of Big Data applications and for different 
forms of data (such as non-numerical data), as 
well as whether similar arguments can be made 
with regards to other digital technologies. 
In any case, a critical engagement with the con-
cepts and premises that become materialized in 
the design of digital technologies is needed, if 
they are not to (re)produce social inequalities. 
When it comes to Big Data, this might include 
that their protagonists acknowledge their own 
situatedness within social relations of power and 
inequality and the effects this position has on the 
design of Big Data technologies and the truth 
claims that they make. This might also include 
to acknowledge the limitations of Big Data, for 
example its tendency to underrepresent already 
marginalized groups such as the elderly or so-
cio-economically disadvantaged persons (Lazer 
and Radford 2017). Last but not least, this means 
to confront Big Data with questions such as: 
Which interests does Big Data (not) serve? 
Which questions can Big Data-based analyses 
(not) ask and answer? Which solutions do Big 
Data-based analyses focus on? 
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